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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Goldman Sachs and Athena Venture Partners 
participated in an arbitration to settle a $1.4 million 
investment-related dispute.  In that proceeding, Athena 
asserted claims of misrepresentation, securities fraud, 
common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, among 
others.  Following a nine-day arbitration hearing, conducted 
under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) 
rules, the panel ruled in favor of Goldman. After the award, 
Athena conducted a background investigation on Demetrio S. 
Timban, one of the panel members.  The investigation 
revealed that Timban failed to make disclosures regarding 
numerous regulatory complaints against him.  
 On a motion to vacate the award, based on these non-
disclosures, the District Court ruled in favor of Athena and 
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ordered a new arbitration hearing.  The District Court 
reasoned that Athena’s rights were compromised by an 
arbitrator who misrepresented his ability to serve on the 
arbitration panel and then abandoned the panel before its final 
ruling. Because we find that Athena waived its right to 
challenge the arbitration award, we reverse the District 
Court’s order vacating the award. 
I. 
 Athena is a limited partnership that invested in several 
funds through Goldman.  In 2007, Goldman approached 
Athena with an investment opportunity in “Liquidity 
Partners,” describing it as a “terrific, low principal risk, short 
term investment with potential higher yields than other 
available cash investments.”1  In addition, Goldman explained 
that the investment was “a diverse portfolio of very safe, 
AAA-rated debt securities.”2 
 In supposed reliance upon these representations, 
Athena invested $5 million in the Liquidity Partners fund.  By 
late 2008, however, Athena incurred about $1.4 million in 
losses on the investment.  Believing that Goldman 
misrepresented the risks associated with the investment, 
Athena initiated arbitration proceedings under the parties’ 
Subscription Agreement.  The Agreement specified that 
FINRA3 rules and regulations applied to the arbitration.  A 
                                              
1 JA-5. 
2 Id. 
3 FINRA is “an independent, not-for-profit organization 
authorized by Congress to protect America’s investors by 
making sure the securities industry operates fairly and 
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three-member panel of arbitrators heard evidence in separate 
sessions in November 2011 and October 2012.  After the first 
panel session, FINRA disclosed to the parties that one of the 
panel members, Demetrio S. Timban, Jr., had been charged 
with the unauthorized practice of law in connection with an 
appearance in a New Jersey municipal court.4  At this point, 
neither party, nor FINRA, objected to Timban’s continued 
participation on the panel.  Likewise, neither party conducted 
further due diligence to follow up on this disclosure.  
Following these hearings, the panel issued its written decision 
finding in favor of Goldman.  Two of the panel members 
signed the award, but Timban did not.  Under the 
Subscription Agreement, only two members of the panel 
needed to sign the award for it to have binding effect.    
                                                                                                     
honestly.”  FINRA (last visited Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://www.finra.org/about. 
4 Timban’s verbatim disclosure to FINRA stated: “In 
September of 2011, I was served with a complaint from the 
State of New Jersey, Case #11-10-01215-I charging me with 
the unauthorized practice of law.  The specific incident in 
question involved my representation of a family frien[d] in a 
local municipal court in Evesham Township.  While 
representing the family friend in the matter, I failed to make a 
motion for admission pro hac vice because while I am 
admitted in both Michigan and New York, I am not admitted 
in New Jersey.  I take full responsibility for the oversight and 
I am working with the State to settle this and I am confident 
this matter will be expunged from my record.  I have also 
informed the state bars of Michigan and New York.  I am 
fully confident that this will in no way affect my ability to be 
fair and impartial in my duties to FINRA.”  JA-327.  
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 After the award, Athena conducted a background 
check on Timban purportedly based on his failure to sign the 
award.  This background check revealed that Timban’s sole 
disclosure was misleading, and that he had failed to disclose 
additional legal troubles.  With respect to his disclosure, 
Timban represented his unauthorized practice as a one-off 
incident.  In reality, Timban maintained an office in Cherry 
Hill, New Jersey for many years, including from 2010-12; he 
represented debtors in bankruptcy courts in both Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey; and he had many complaints lodged against 
him for the unauthorized practice of law in 1999, 2002, 2004, 
and 2006.  In other words, when Timban described his 
unauthorized practice charge as a simple “oversight,” he 
misrepresented the true scope of his problems. 
 
 As to the subsequent legal issues, first, in April 2012, a 
formal complaint against Timban was filed with the Attorney 
Discipline Board for the State of Michigan, citing Timban for 
issuing bad checks totaling $18,145, with intent to defraud.  
This allegation constitutes not only a violation of the 
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, but the conduct is 
considered a felony criminal offense under Michigan law.    
  
 Second, in July 2012, another formal complaint against 
Timban was filed with the Attorney Discipline Board for the 
State of Michigan.  This complaint cited Timban for 
“engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law” as a result 
of the unauthorized practice of law in the state of New Jersey. 
   
 Third, in October 2012, Timban entered into a 
stipulation with the Grievance Administrator for the Attorney 
Discipline Board for the State of Michigan, pleading no 
contest to the allegations of the two formal complaints.  He 
agreed to a 175-day suspension of his license to practice law.  
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Neither Timban, nor FINRA, disclosed any of these issues, 
which occurred prior to the second arbitration session, to the 
parties at any time.  In November 2012, days after the parties 
submitted post-hearing briefs to the panel, the Attorney 
Discipline Board for the State of Michigan entered an order 
suspending Timban.   
 
 After Athena conducted this background check and 
unearthed these additional legal issues, it filed a motion to 
vacate the arbitration award.  In the District Court, Athena 
argued that vacatur was proper because Timban’s conduct 
and his failure to disclose violated both FINRA’s rules and 
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  The District Court agreed 
and, therefore, granted Athena’s motion to vacate and denied 
Goldman’s application to confirm the arbitration award.  
Holding that Timban’s initial disclosure was “so grossly 
misleading and incomplete,” the District Court rejected 
Goldman’s argument that Athena waived its right to 
challenge the panel’s award.  In so finding, the District Court 
held that FINRA failed to provide the parties with three 
qualified arbitrators and that vacatur was the proper remedy 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), and 
(a)(4).  Accordingly, the District Court vacated the arbitration 
award and remanded for rehearing before a new panel.  
II. 
 Goldman raises two main issues on appeal: (1) the 
District Court erred in holding Athena did not waive its right 
to challenge the arbitration award; and (2) the District Court 
erred in vacating the award.5   
                                              
5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) 
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A. 
 Goldman argues that, by waiting to challenge 
Timban’s participation on the panel until after the award, 
Athena waived its right to seek vacatur of the award.  To 
determine whether Athena waived this right, we must decide 
how waiver applies in the arbitration context, a question of 
first impression in this Circuit.6     
 Although many circuits generally agree that a party 
waives a claim based on the conduct of an arbitrator if the 
party fails to raise those concerns prior to or during the 
arbitration hearings, most have recognized that a blanket 
waiver rule is inappropriate.  For instance, in the Sixth 
Circuit, waiver applies only if the party knew of the facts 
suggesting bias during the proceeding.7  The Ninth Circuit, 
along with several others, applies a constructive knowledge 
standard, finding waiver where a party “has constructive 
                                                                                                     
because the underlying arbitration included federal securities 
law claims.  We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) because this is an appeal 
of the District Court’s final order vacating an arbitration 
award.  
6 Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 
249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Our Court has yet to explain how waiver 
applies in the arbitration context.”). 
7 See Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 
(6th Cir. 1989) (applying waiver only if “[a]ll the facts now 
argued as to [the] alleged bias were known . . . at the time the 
[arbitrator] heard their grievances” (quoting Early v. E. 
Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1983))). 
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knowledge of a potential conflict but fails to timely object.”8  
The Ninth Circuit viewed this as a better approach in light of 
its “policy favoring the finality of arbitration awards.”9  
 Constructive knowledge is defined as the 
“[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence 
should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given 
person.”10  Our sister circuits have interpreted constructive 
knowledge in this context to mean that a complaining party 
either knew or should have known of facts indicating 
partiality or other misconduct of an arbitrator.  Relevant to 
this point, the First Circuit commented that a party “which 
was put on notice of the risk when it signed the contract [and] 
chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of the Committee 
members either before or during the hearing” waived the right 
to challenge the decision.11  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit 
applied constructive knowledge where a party “did not have 
full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now 
object, [but] they did have concerns about [the arbitrator’s] 
impartiality and yet chose to have her remain on the panel 
rather than spend time and money investigating further until 
                                              
8 Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 
1313 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Tatung 
Co., 379 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2004); JCI Commc’n, Inc. v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st 
Cir. 2003); Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 593 
(8th Cir. 1998). 
9 Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB, 386 F.3d at 1313. 
10 Black’s Law Dictionary 888 (8th ed., 2004). 
11 JCI Commc’n, Inc., 324 F.3d at 52. 
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losing the arbitration.”12  The Second Circuit has stated that 
“where the complaining party should have known of the 
relationship . . . or could have learned of the relationship just 
as easily before or during the arbitration rather than after it 
lost its case,” constructive knowledge existed and resulted in 
waiver.13  Constructive knowledge in the arbitration context 
reasonably requires parties to “exercise as much diligence and 
tenacity in ferreting out potential conflicts . . . []in selecting 
the panel[] as they do . . . []once attacking the award became 
the sole reason to research the arbitrators[].”14  Moreover, 
where a party is capable of “thoroughly and systematically 
digging for dirt on each of the three arbitrators,” it should do 
so prior to being solely motivated by the chance of vacating 
the award.15   
                                              
12 Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 593. 
13 Lucent Techs. Inc., 379 F.3d at 28 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
14 Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 
457 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
15 Id. at 440; see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 
714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It is true that the 
disclosure requirements are intended in part to avoid the costs 
of background investigations. But this is a $10 million case. If 
Leatherby had been worried about putting its fate into the 
hands of someone who might be linked in the distant past to 
the adversary’s principal, it would have done more than it did 
to find out about [the arbitrator]. That it did so little suggests 
that its fear of a prejudiced panel is a tactical response to 
having lost the arbitration.”). 
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 Indeed, we came close to adopting the “constructive 
knowledge” standard in a previous case.  In Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, the appellant challenged an 
arbitration award based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a 
relationship to one of the parties to the arbitration.16   The 
district court denied the appellant’s motion to vacate the 
award, finding the nondisclosures were immaterial and 
insubstantial.  While neither party raised the waiver issue, we 
addressed it and opined that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s approach 
has considerable merit: a party waives later challenges only if 
it either knew or should have known of the facts indicating 
partiality.”17  We view this approach favorably because it 
“allows a party to challenge an arbitration when it had no way 
of discovering the arbitrator’s bias beforehand”18 while, “at 
the same time, it encourages investigation by making the 
parties accountable for information they should have known.  
Moreover, it prevents the losing party from receiving a 
second bite at the apple.”19  The rationale for applying 
constructive knowledge in the arbitration context makes good 
sense.  It both encourages parties to conduct adequate due 
diligence prior to issuance of the award and promotes the 
arbitration goals of efficiency and finality.  Therefore, we 
conclude that if a party could have reasonably discovered that 
any type of malfeasance, ranging from conflicts-of-interest to 
non-disclosures such as those at issue here, was afoot during 
the hearings, it should be precluded from challenging the 
subsequent award on those grounds.   
                                              
16 709 F.3d at 246.  
17 Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18 Id. 
19 Id.   
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 In this case, Goldman argues that Athena waived its 
claims to vacate the award.  Specifically, Goldman contends 
that Timban’s initial disclosure, while incomplete, provided 
the specific charge against him and the docket number for his 
case.  Hence, Athena could have conducted, at the very least, 
a cursory background check as early as April 2012.  Athena, 
however, asserts that Timban’s incomplete disclosure, 
coupled with his failure to disclose the additional legal issues, 
weighs against finding waiver.  Because Timban’s subsequent 
legal issues occurred after his initial disclosure, the argument 
goes, Athena could not have waived its right to vacatur.  Even 
if it had done a background check, these other issues could 
not have been identified.  We disagree.  While we appreciate 
Athena’s argument with respect to the timing of the 
subsequent legal issues, it does not change the fact that 
Athena should have raised a challenge based solely on the 
initial disclosure.   
 Applying the constructive knowledge standard, the 
question becomes whether Athena knew or could have known 
about the extent of Timban’s unauthorized-practice-of-law 
charge.  We believe it could have.  The initial disclosure, 
deficient as it was, provided enough alarming information to 
compel the parties to do further research on Timban.  Or at 
least such a disclosure should have provoked alarm.  Indeed, 
the essence of an unauthorized-practice-of-law charge is that 
a person has made serious misrepresentations to a court of 
law.  At bottom, this should have been enough to set off 
sirens for both parties, irrespective of the circumstances 
behind the charge.  That his disclosure was deficient, and that 
he failed to make the additional disclosures, certainly 
exacerbates concerns regarding Timban’s character and 
fitness to serve as an arbitrator—but the crux of the issue 
before us is that Athena could have expressed the same 
concerns after the first disclosure.  Had Athena conducted the 
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same diligence after Timban’s disclosure, it would likely have 
discovered not only the true extent of Timban’s unauthorized 
practice of law, but that his disclosure to FINRA itself was 
false.  Indeed, Athena attached a probable cause statement to 
its motion to vacate, which revealed that Timban had been 
practicing out of an office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey and that 
the New Jersey Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law 
had received complaints about Timban in 1999, 2000, 2002, 
and 2004.20  Athena, however, failed to look into the matter 
further until after it lost in arbitration.  
 This is the paradigmatic case of the “sore loser,” so to 
speak, trying for a second bite at the apple—and the exact 
type of case the law disfavors.  A party should not be 
permitted to game the system by rolling the dice on whether 
to raise the challenge during the proceedings or wait until it 
loses to seek vacatur on the issue.  Nor should a party “wait[] 
until [it] los[es] and then almost immediately beg[i]n scouring 
the internet for anything that might suggest one arbitrator or 
another was biased against it.”21  This is all to say, under the 
constructive knowledge standard, a party may not conduct a 
background investigation on an arbitrator after the award with 
the sole motivation to seek vacatur.  If it were any other way, 
                                              
20 The District Court itself stated that it “would be inclined to 
agree with [Goldman’s] argument that, by failing to object or 
request Mr. Timban’s removal following the issuance of his 
updated disclosure in March, 2012, [Athena] waived [its] 
right to now challenge the panel’s award, were it not for the 
fact that it was so grossly misleading.”  JA-21.  Had it, 
however, applied the constructive knowledge standard we 
now adopt, the District Court may have also found waiver.   
21 Stone, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 456.  
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arbitrations would cease to have finality and result in endless 
hearings within hearings. 
 Accordingly, because Athena had constructive 
knowledge of Timban’s insufficient disclosure, we conclude 
that it waived its right to challenge the award.  Because we 
hold that Athena waived its right to vacatur, we need not 
address Goldman’s second argument that FINRA failed to 
provide the parties with three qualified arbitrators. 
 We would be remiss not to mention that even had 
Athena raised the issue during the panel hearing, it is unclear 
under which statutory ground it could have called for 
Timban’s removal.  FINRA’s rules effectively isolated 
Timban from both disqualification prior to empanelment and 
removal once the hearings began.  We thus agree with the 
District Court’s sentiments that “it [finds ] remarkable that 
neither of these parties nor, more particularly, FINRA saw fit 
to conduct any investigation or due diligence into Mr. 
Timban’s qualifications after he revealed that he was the 
subject of a complaint by the State of New Jersey for 
unauthorized practice.”22  We further agree that FINRA’s 
June 2013 announcement that it would conduct annual 
background checks on its arbitrators and additional review 
before appointment is “too little too late” in this case.23  
Nevertheless, this potential inequity with respect to FINRA 
rules does not alter our analysis on waiver. 
                                              
22 JA-21.   
23 See id. 
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III. 
 For all the reasons stated above, we reverse the District 
Court’s order granting vacatur and remand for further 
proceedings with respect to Goldman’s motion to confirm the 
arbitration award.  
